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BRISCOE V. HARPER OIL CO.: DOUBLE
RECOVERY OF TEMPORARY AND
PERMANENT DAMAGES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Many students who studied damages in tort law have read these
words: "Compared to the rules involved in measuring damages for per-
sonal injury and death, the rules in cases of injury to personal property
are simple and straightforward. The basic measure is the difference be-
tween the market value of the property before the injury and its market
value after."1 But in the world of oil and gas production, the rules cover-
ing damages to real property are anything but straightforward.
In Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co.,2 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ad-
dressed the problem of surface damage caused to an oil and gas lessor's
land by a negligent lessee. The court found that both temporary and
permanent damages may be recovered in a nuisance action for injury to
the same parcel of land.3 The court did not actually state that this ruling
constituted a change in Oklahoma law,4 but the dissenting justices
opined that if an intentional change had not been made, an inadvertant
mistake had been.5
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lester and Myrtle Briscoe own a farm in Grady County, Oklahoma,
1. J. HENDERSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 280 (2d ed. 1981).
2. 702 P.2d 33 (Okla. 1985).
3. Id. at 36. The court defined nuisance as "a class of wrongs which arises from an unreason-
able, unwarranted, or unlawful use by a person or entity of property lawfully possessed, but which
works an obstruction or injury to the right of another." Id. The court, citing City of Holdenville v.
Kiser, 195 Okla. 189, 156 P.2d 363 (1945), went on to say that "permanent, as well as temporary
damages, may be recovered for the maintenance of a temporary nuisance." Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36.
4. The court relied on City of Holdenville v. Kiser, 195 Okla. 189, 156 P.2d 363 (1945), for the
proposition that both temporary and permanent damages are recoverable. See supra note 3.
5. The rule applied by the dissenting justices is taken from Enid & Anadarko Ry. Co. v.
Wiley, 14 Okla. 310, 320-21, 78 P. 96, 99 (1904); see also Ellison v. Walker, 281 P.2d 931, 932-33
(Okla. 1955) (owner of house awarded cost of repairing damage caused by vibrations of defendant's
drilling and operation of oil and gas well). This rule would allow recovery of either temporary or
permanent damages, depending on which is the lesser measure. If the diminution in value is less
than the cost of restoration, the diminution is the measure of recovery for permanent injury to land.
If the cost of restoration is less than the diminution in value, cost of restoration is the measure of
recovery. Enid, 14 Okla. at 320-21, 78 P. at 99. For an explanation of the definition of temporary
and permanent damages and their proper measure, see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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where they grow wheat and alfalfa and raise cattle.6 In January of 1976,
the Briscoes entered into an oil and gas lease agreement with Harper Oil.
The well ultimately drilled under the lease was a dry hole, and Harper
abandoned the well in July of 1980. The dry hole was plugged eight
months later, but Harper did not begin to close the reserve pit and clean
up the drill site until May of 1981-one month after the Briscoes filed
their lawsuit.
The Briscoes' suit set forth three causes of action. The first cause,
based on contract, alleged that under the terms of the lease between
Harper Oil and the Briscoes, Harper was required to pay for damages to
growing crops. In the second cause of action, the Briscoes sought recov-
ery for temporary and permanent injury to their land. They alleged that
Harper's unreasonable acts, or unreasonable failure to act, subjected
them to inconvenience, interfered with their enjoyment of the land, and
caused permanent damage to portions of the land for agricultural and
grazing purposes. In the third cause of action, the Briscoes sought puni-
tive damages for Harper's willful, oppressive, and grossly negligent disre-
gard of the fertility and productivity of the soil.
The jury found for the Briscoes on all counts and awarded perma-
nent damages for injury to the farmland and temporary damages for the
cost of restoring the well site.7 The Court of Appeals reversed the jury
verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, stating that recovery of
both temporary and permanent damages constitutes double recovery.'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reinstated the jury verdict.9 The
supreme court stated that the sole issue addressed was the propriety of
the trial court's instructions permitting the jury to return a verdict
awarding damages which included the cost of repairing temporary abata-
ble injuries to the well site, as well as damages for permanent unabatable
injury to the farmland. 10
According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Briscoe, when the
cause of action is based on a nuisance theory, both permanent and tem-
porary damages may be recovered. 1 However, the court also stated that
6. This summary is taken from Briscoe, 702 P. 2d at 35.
7. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 35. The jury's aggregate award was for $42,975.00: $1,600.00 was
awarded on count one for damage to crops, $24,500.00 was awarded for cost of restoring the area of
the well site (temporary damages), $6,375.00 was awarded for permanent injury to the farmland
(permanent damages), and $10,500.00 was awarded apparently as punitive damages. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 36.
10. Id.
11. See supra note 3.
[Vol. 22:551
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"[t]he rule of damages in any given case brought on the theory of nui-
sance is determined by whether the injury suffered is permanent or tem-
porary,"" and that "in no event shall the combined award of temporary
and permanent damages for injury to the land exceed the decreased fair
market value of the land....
III. LAW PRIOR TO Briscoe
A. Liability for Surface Damage
An oil and gas lease gives the lessee the right to use the surface of
the leased land to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of the lease.14 The oil and gas lessee has the dominant estate in so
much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for carrying on the oil and
gas operations. 15 The oil and gas lessee has a property interest in the
surface of the land16 as well as a right to search for, develop, and produce
the minerals beneath it. If the lessee injures the surface while exercising
these rights, the lessee is not liable unless he has been negligent. 7 If the
12. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36.
13. Id. at 37.
14. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Reasonably Necessary Use of the Surface of the
Leasehold by a Mineral Owner, Lessee, or Driller Under an Oil & Gas Lease or Drilling Contract, 53
A.L.R. 3d 16 § 2[a] (1973). A lease gives the lessee the right to possess and use the surface of the
leasehold to the extent necessary to perform obligations of the lease, including the right to enter the
premises and use and occupy them in any manner reasonably necessary. Id.
15. Id.
16. In Oklahoma, an oil and gas lease is characterized as an incorporeal hereditament or a
profit a prendre. Continental Supply Co. v. Marshal, 152 F.2d 300, 305 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied
sub nom 327 U.S. 803 (1946); United States v. Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co., 113 F.2d 194,
198 (10th Cir. 1940).
There are two principal theories regarding ownership of oil and gas: the ownership-in-place
theory and the exclusive-right-to-take theory. Under the ownership-in-place theory, "the land-
owner owns all substances, including oil and gas, which underlie his land. Such ownership is quali-
fied, however, in the case of oil and gas, by the operation of the law of capture." E. KUNTZ, 1 A
TREATISE OF THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.4 (1962). In other words, the landowner owns the oil
and gas subject to the possibility that another will capture it. Professor Kuntz has defined the exclu-
sive-right-to-take theory as a theory in which:
the landowner does not own the oil and gas which underlie his land. He merely has the
exclusive right to capture such substances by operations on his land. Once reduced to
dominion and control, such substances become the object of absolute ownership, but, until
capture, the property right is described as an exclusive right to capture.
Id. Oklahoma follows the exclusive-right-to-take theory, which is also known as the non-ownership
theory. J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 23 (1983).
17. Reasonable surface uses have been found in the following cases: Livingston v. Indian Terri-
tory Illuminating Oil Co., 91 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1937) (building residences for employees); Yates v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1950) (conducting seismographic tests); Sun Oil Co. v. Whita-
ker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (use of fresh water belonging to the surface estate); Macha v.
Crouch, 500 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (slush pits); Gregg v. Caldwell-Guadalupe Pick-up
Stations, 286 S.W. 1083 (rex. Ct. App. 1926) (building storage tanks and power stations); Grimes v.
Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919) (locating a derrick and slush pit near a
3
Hudson-Downs: Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co.: Double Recovery of Temporary and Perma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:551
lessee's use of the land goes beyond what is reasonably necessary, he will
be held liable for surface damage based on a nuisance theory. II There-
fore, there can only be liability where the lessee has exercised his rights in
a negligent or willfully destructive manner, or where the lessee has used
more land than necessary to produce the lease. 9
B. Measure of Damages
Injury to real property has historically been classified as being either
temporary or permanent, and recovery for each type of injury has been
measured differently. Temporary damage is defined in Oklahoma as that
which is abatable or repairable.2" The general rule is that for temporary
damage, the amount recoverable is the cost of restoring the land to its
condition immediately prior to the injury.2 Permanent injury means
dwelling house); and Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950) (non-
negligent destruction of growing crops).
The lessee's use of the land is limited only by the requirement of reasonable necessity. If dam-
age to the land is incidental to the reasonable development of the leasehold, the damage is damnum
absque injuria and no recovery can be had by the lessor. See generally 4 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS
§ 652 (1962). For this reason, it became common practice for an express surface damages clause, or
a clause limiting surface use, to be included in oil and gas leases. See Lambert, Surface Rights of the
Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. Rav. 373, 375 (1958). One typical clause limiting surface use is the
following: "When required by the Lessor, Lessee shall bury all pipe lines below ordinary plow
depth, and no well shall be drilled within two hundred (200) feet of any residence or barn located on
said land as of the date of this Lease without Lessor's consent." Source, AAPL FORM 675, Oil &
Gas Lease, Texas Form, 7.
18. A nuisance is defined as:
[U]nlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which act or omission either...
[a]nnoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others; or... [i]n
any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property, provided, this
section shall not apply to preexisting agricultural activities.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1 (1981); see also Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1393 (Okla. 1973)
(failure to fill and level abandoned wells and remove equipment and concrete foundations).
19. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 103 N.M. 117, 703 P.2d 894, 897 (1985) (mineral
lessee's liability to surface estate owner founded on unreasonable, excessive, or negligent use of the
surface estate). Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77, 82 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984)
("[R]easonably necessary surface use must be exercised with due regard to the right of the owner of
the surface."); Pulaski Oil Co. v. Connor, 62 Okla. 211, 214, 162 P. 464, 466 (Okla. 1916) (reason-
ably necessary use limitation implies lessee's duty to protect those areas of the surface estate not
reasonably necessary for development of mineral rights). It is generally accepted that use of more
land than reasonably necessary constitutes a nuisance. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
20. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36. "Temporary damages in the context of an oil and gas nuisance are
by definition abatable. Damages reasonably incapable of abatement are permanent." Id.
21. See Enid & Anadarko Ry. Co. v. Wiley, 14 Okla. at 320-21, 78 P. at 99 (1904); Keck v.
Bruster, 368 P.2d 1003, 1004-05 (Okla. 1962). There is some authority that recovery for temporary
damage should be measured in terms of the lost rental value of the property. Conkin v. Ruth, 581
P.2d 923, 925 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Harmon v. Myrick, 46 OKLA. B. J. 2468, 2469 (Okla. Ct. App.
1975). See also, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 103 N.M. 117, 703 P.2d 894 (1985), in
which the New Mexico Supreme Court differentiated three measures of recovery for three different
situations: (1) for permanent damage to real property, damages are measured by the difference be-
tween fair market value immediately before the injury and fair market value after the full extent of
4
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that the land can not be restored to its original state. The measure of
damages for permanent injury is the difference between the fair market
value of the land immediately preceding and immediately following the
injury. 22
These definitions are easy to apply so long as the injury complained
of can be classified as either permanent or temporary and costs for resto-
ration of temporary injury do not exceed the resulting diminution in the
market value of the land. If the cost of repairing a temporary injury to
the land is greater than the diminution in value of the land the problem is
easily solved. It is accepted that the measure of damages should be the
lesser of the cost of restoring the land or the decrease in market value.23
Given this rule, should there ever be recovery for both temporary and
permanent injury to the same parcel of land?
Two earlier Oklahoma cases deal with the proper measure of dam-
ages for injury to land by an oil and gas lessee. First, Thompson v.
Andover Oil Co.24 deals with a surface owner's nuisance suit against an
oil and gas lessee.25 The Thompson court assessed the problem of dam-
ages somewhat differently than did the Briscoe court. The court in
Thompson found three distinct categories for recovery of damages to real
property. The court stated that "[iln cases involving surface damages the
alleged damages will normally be either permanent damage, temporary
damage, or damage caused from the maintenance of a nuisance.
Although all three are related somewhat, the measure of damage is calcu-
the injury has been suffered; (2) for temporary injury, damages are measured by the cost of repair;
and (3) where the actions of the lessee have rendered the surface of the estate totally unusable for a
period of time, damages are measured by the rental value of the land during that time. Amoco, 103
N.M. at _, 702 P.2d at 897-98.
22. Conk-in, 581 P.2d at 925.
23. This is the same measure as is applied to recovery for permanent injury. Id. Damage to
real property is deemed permanent if the cost of restoration exceeds the value of the property. See
generally Annot., supra note 14, § 2[e].
24. 691 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
25. The Thompsons were surface owners who sued to recover for damages to their farm land
which resulted from drilling operations by Andover Oil Co. in 1981. Andover Oil Co. had prepared
to drill at one site, then abandoned it in favor of a second site on the opposite side of the farm where
they expected greater success. Andover attempted to restore the first site, but in so doing changed
the grade of the land, causing water to stand and making it unsuitable for growing certain types of
crops. The Thompsons alleged permanent damage resulting from Andover's burial of drilling mud
on the land. The Thompson's evidence of temporary damages included erosion, silting of the pond,
and irregular grading. Thejury awarded a lump sum of $50,000, which was greater than the amount
of depreciation testified to by the plaintiff's expert witness. Testimony placed the restoration costs
as high as $70,000. The Court stated that "while the award for damages for restoration cannot
exceed the depreciation value of the land, the $50,000 award is clearly within the bounds of the
evidence presented." Thompson, 691 P.2d at 84.
1987]
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lated differently for each."'26 The measure of damage for permanent in-
jury would be the diminished value of the entire parcel of land.27 The
measure of damages where injury is temporary is the reasonable cost of
restoring the land to its former condition.2 The measure of recovery for
damage to real property in an action based on nuisance includes "both
permanent and temporary injury to property as well as damages for
annoyance." 29
The second case, Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen,3" was relied on by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court both in Briscoe and in Thompson. Allen
firmly established that, in Oklahoma, recovery could be had from an oil
and gas lessee based on nuisance. 31 The case equated nuisance with the
taking of more land than reasonably necessary, or the use of the land for
longer than a reasonably necessary time.32 On the subject of damages,
the court stated in the syllabus:
Damages adjudged in an action predicated on a nuisance theory may
include clean-up costs of oil and gas lessee's surface impediments not
necessary for its operation, damages for use of land by lessee for more
than a reasonably necessary period of time for its operations, for
lessee's unnecessary use of land area in its operations, and for tempo-
rary and permanent injury to the land.33
Although Thompson refers to three types of damage, there are really
only two types- temporary and permanent. The third type merely iden-
tifies circumstances in which both temporary and permanent damages
may be recovered. Allen gives of laundry list of examples of recoverable
damages, but the list makes no sense. The most reasonable conclusion as
to what is meant by the quoted language is that both temporary and
permanent damages may be recovered in an action based on a nuisance
theory.
The Briscoe opinion may be an attempt by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to clear up confusion over the issue of damages. As noted by both
26. Id. at 82.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id.
30. 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973) (hereinafter Allen).
31. Id. at 1394-95. In Allen, Tenneco Oil Co., the assignee of an oil and gas lease, allegedly
created a nuisance by using more of the surface than reasonably necessary and caused damage to the
land by allowing salt water and oil to escape and flow over the land. The plaintiff sought $4,000
damages for use of more land than reasonably necessary and $3,000 as damages for temporary injury
to the land. The jury awarded $5,150. Id.
32. "Surface impediments constructed by an oil and gas lessee may be only those reasonably
necessary for its operation, and when they are no longer such, they may constitute a nuisance." Id.
at 1392.
33. Tenneco, 515 P.2d at 1392 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 22:551
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the majority and the dissenting justices, the fact that both temporary and
permanent damages may be recovered on a nuisance theory for injury to
land did not first arise with Briscoe.34 The dissenting justices seem will-
ing to go so far as to agree that such recovery is occasionally appropri-
ate."5 The problem is a disagreement as to the application of the theory.
The major purpose for awarding money damages is to make an in-
jured party whole.3 6 Where an injured party is compensated twice for
the same injury, there is a "double recovery." This puts the injured party
in a better position than he would have been and clearly defeats the ma-
jor purpose of awarding the damages. The problem that arose in Briscoe
was that the temporary injury and the permanent injury, and the amount
of damages awarded for each, were not clearly separated.37
A careful reading of the opinion reveals that the permanent injury
complained of consisted of drainage problems and soil erosion which re-
sulted from oil and other harmful substances being allowed to run out of
the well-head and reserve pit over the farmland and into the terraces and
creeks.38 Some of the injuries cited as temporary were: the failure of
Harper Oil to properly dispose of drilling mud and debris; failure to re-
move the drilling pad and roadway; and failure to reclaim the reserve pit,
pad, and roadway for agricultural purposes.39
34. According to the majority, City of Holdenville v. Kiser, 195 Okla. 189, 156 P.2d 363
(1945), provides authority for the proposition that permanent and temporary damages "may be re-
covered for maintenance of a temporary nuisance." Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36. The dissent cites Ten-
neco v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973), and Lanahan v. Meyers, 389 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1964), for the
proposition that both temporary and permanent damages may be recovered on a nuisance theory.
Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 40.
35. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 40-41. The dissent stated: "There could be no objection to allowing
recovery for correctable, temporary damage to one portion of a leased tract in addition to perma-
nent, diminished value damage to another portion of the tract so long as the jury was properly
instructed to avoid duplication of damages." Id. at 41.
36. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (1966). Damages are based on the theory of just compensation for
the loss or injury sustained regardless of the form of the action. See also Public Service Co. of New
Mexico v. Jasso, 96 N.M. 800, 635 P.2d 1003 (1981) (theory of damages to make injured party
whole); Carter v. Wolf Creek Highway Water Dist., 54 Or. App. 569, 635 P.2d 1036 (1981) (goal of
damage remedy is compensation); Agrilease, Inc. v. Gray, 173 Mont. 151, 566 P.2d 1114 (1977)
(damages properly awarded when they serve to compensate plaintiff for injury proximately caused
by defendant); Houser v. Eckhardt, 168 Colo. 226, 506 P.2d 751 (1972) (underlying principal of
awarding damages on negligence theory is that one who unlawfully injures another shall make him
whole).
37. The Briscoes plead facts sufficient for the jury to find that there had been both temporary
and permanent injury to their land. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36-37. For the costs of restoring the well
site to its former condition, the Briscoes requested an amount of $34,000. The alleged permanent
damage to the farm consisted of decreased productivity and fertility of the soil for which the Briscoes
requested $36,500. The pleadings did not adequately explain that the permanent damage done was
assesed with the temporary damage to the well site included.
38. Id. at 36-37.
39. Id.
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An expert witness for the Briscoes, testifying as to permanent dam-
age to productivity of the soil, stated that (a) it would cost $91,000 to
restore the farmland completely; and (b) minimum clean-up would cost
$34,000.4 Unfortunately, his testimony was apparently couched in
terms of temporary damages,41 and caused confusion. Three other wit-
nesses testified as to the decreased fair market value of the land fixing the
damages at $36,500, $29,282, and $20,433 respectively.42
The jury awarded $24,500 for cost of restoring the temporary abata-
ble injury to the well site and $6,375 for permanent unabatable injury to
the farmland.43 The total award did not exceed the amount of either
temporary or permanent damages prayed for in the ad damnum clause,44
and both awards were well within the bounds of the evidence.4 5 Never-
theless, the defendant claimed that the award amounted to double recov-
ery for the same injury.46
According to the defendant, the statement of the issues and instruc-
tions given at the close of the trial improperly stated the law in
Oklahoma and misled the jury to believe that they could return damages
for both diminution in value and restoration of the property.47
In fact, however, the law in Oklahoma does allow recovery for both
types of injuries in certain situations. 48 The problem is one of semantics.
40. Id.
41. Cost of restoration is the measure of temporary damages. See supra notes 20, 21, and ac-
companying text.
42. Briscoe, 702 P.2d at 36-37.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Id. at 38-39. The preliminary statement of the issues as to temporary and permanent dam-
ages was:
3. Should you find Defendant's drilling operations created a private nuisance, then you
should determine the amount of damages for the reasonable cost of abating the nuisance by
restoring the site to its former condition, such amount not to exceed $34,000, the amount
sued for.
4. Whether or not Defendant's drilling operations permanently damaged Plaintiffs' land
in an amount not to exceed $36,500, the sum sued for.
Id. at 38. The Instruction given concerning the same issues was:
Under issue No. 3, as previously outlined to you in the Instructions, should you find that
Plaintiffs have proved Defendant's drilling operations created a private nuisance, as defined
in these instructions, then you should determine the amount of damages, if any, for the
reasonable cost of abating the nuisance by restoring the site to its former condition, such
amount not to exceed $34,000, the amount sued for.
Under Issue No.4, as previously outlined to you in these Instructions, you should deter-
mine whether or not Plaintiffs have proved that Defendant's drilling operations perma-
nently damaged Plaintiffs land in an amount not to exceed $36,500, the amount sued for.
Id.
48. As noted earlier, and as cited in Briscoe, there is authority in Oklahoma which supports the
8
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One must carefully define the injuries sustained and the recovery being
sought in order to avoid overlap. Permanent injury in the form of de-
creased market value of a parcel of land may be assessed without includ-
ing particular abatable injuries.' 9 Then, if cost of restoration is limited to
the particular abatable injuries, there can be recovery of both permanent
and temporary damages without duplication.
In spite of the arguably confusing instructions given by the Briscoe
trial court,"° the jury was apparently able to separate temporary and per-
manent damages. As the court put it:
While the instructions failed to state that in no event shall the com-
bined award of temporary and permanent damages for injury to the
land exceed the decreased fair market value of the land, such error, if
that it be, was here harmless in nature. The jury awarded the sum of
$24,500 for costs of restoring the temporary abatable injury to the well
site, plus the sum of $6,375 for permanent unabatable injury to the
farm.51
The court also observed that the sum of the temporary and permanent
damages 52 was within the scope of the evidence.53
The trial court did not clearly differentiate between the decreased
fair market value of the land considering all the injuries, both temporary
and permanent, and the decreased fair market value of the land minus
awarding of both temporary and permanent damages. Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77
(Okla. 1984); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973); disscussedsupra notes 24-33 and
accompanying text; see also Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1970) (rule of
damages in any case brought on a nuisance theory is determined by the type of injury suffered,
permanent or temporary); City of Holdenville v. Kiser, 195 Old. 189, 156 P.2d 363 (1945) ("dam-
age" or "injury" as normally used in nuisance cases is the result of the nuisance and both permanent
and temporary damages may be recovered).
49. See Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Moore, 431 P.2d 328 (Okla. 1967), in which only permanent
damages were awarded, although there had also been testimony regarding temporary damages. On
appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court had allowed improper mixing of the evidence
relating to permanent and temporary damage to the land. The supreme court stated that, "[w]hile it
is true that evidence was adduced by plaintiff tending to show that growing crops, such as tame
grasses, were damaged or destroyed, the trial court very carefully and accurately excluded this ele-
ment from the consideration of the jury by its instruction .. " Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
The trial court's instruction stated that the jury was not to consider any temporary damages
because under the pleadings and evidence the plaintiffs were limited in their recovery to permanent
damages. Id. According to the supreme court, evidence of temporary damage was allowed at trial
only for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in determining permanent damages. Id. at 330-31.
50. See supra note 47 for the text of the instructions.
51. Id. (latter emphasis added). The award of temporary damages made by the jury seems to be
specifically for damages to the well site, while the award for permanent damages seems to be only to
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the temporary injuries. 4 Yet the conclusion that there was no double
recovery or overlap of the awards makes sense if it is assumed that the
court had this distinction in mind.
This assumption supports the proposition that the damages for tem-
porary and permanent injury to the Briscoes' land were awarded inde-
pendently of each other." This conclusion reconciles the majority and
dissenting opinions. The concern of the dissent was simply that award-
ing money damages twice, under different names for the same injury, be
avoided. 6 The dissenters agreed with the majority that "[t]here could be
no objection to allowing recovery for correctable, temporary damage to
one portion of a leased tract in addition to permanent, diminished value
damage to another portion of the tract, so long as the jury was properly
instructed to avoid duplication of damages." 57 Assuming the jury was
instructed properly, if they nonetheless managed to avoid duplication of
damages, there was no reversible error.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity
Briscoe presented to clarify Oklahoma law concerning temporary and
permanent damages.58 The confusion concerning the awards of tempo-
rary and permanent damages-how they should be plead and measured,
how and when they may be awarded, and the proper instructions to be
given concerning them-could have been resolved. As things stand after
Briscoe, the next time an oil and gas lessor recovers both temporary and
permanent damages from a lessee, or fails to recover both because the
recovery would amount to a double recovery, the supreme court will
have another opportunity to address the problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has made it clear that it intends that
both temporary and permanent damages be recoverable by an oil and gas
lessor for surface damage in an action based on nuisance. However, the
court has left many practical questions unanswered. The court needs to
54. Although the trial court did not explain the difference, the reference to the award for tem-
porary damages being for restoring abatable injuries to the well site while the award for permanent
damages was to compensate the Briscoes for permanent injury to their farmland shows a distinction.
Briscoe at 35.
55. It is apparent that the jury assessed the permanent damage to the farmland without includ-
ing the temporary damage to the well site for which they made a separate award.
56. Id. at 40. "To allow damages for both diminution in value and the cost of restoration for
the same injury to property amounts to a double recovery .... ." Id.
57. Id. at 41.
58. Stated simply, both temporary and permanent damages may be recovered on a nuisance or
negligence theory, but each type of damage must be proved and valued independently.
[Vol. 22:551
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss4/4
TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT DAMAGES
set up guidelines which clearly separate temporary and permanent dam-
ages. Permanent and temporary damages do not necessarily overlap, as
long as the assessment of the diminution in the market value of the land
is made without considering the damage done by the temporary injuries.
The jury which heard Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co. apparently was able
to keep the awards for permanent and temporary damages separated de-
spite unclear jury instructions. The award of temporary damages was
specifically for the damage to the well site and the award for permanent
damages was specifically for the damaged quality of the farmland.
Although the well site was encompassed within the land which was dam-
aged farmland, the land and the damage were not one and the same. In
assessing the permanent damage to the farmland, the jury was not to,
and in fact did not, consider any devaluation caused by temporary injury
to the well site.
The court should speak clearly on the issue of how instructions on
the issue of damages are to be given in order to make sure that the jury
does not overlap awards for temporary and permanent damages. The
instructions should remind the jury that diminution in the value of land
must be valued as if any temporary injury either did not exist or was
already abated. With a clear demarcation, temporary and permanent
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